Contempt of court is a constitutional mechanism designed to protect the sanctity, authority and functioning of the judiciary. In India, contempt is governed by constitutional provisions and supporting legislation, creating a dual classification that serves distinctly different purposes yet shares the common goal of preserving judicial integrity. Civil contempt occurs when a person wilfully disobeys or breaches a court order—whether an injunction, decree, direction or any binding judicial pronouncement. The emphasis falls on the voluntary, deliberate nature of the breach. A person bound by a court order who consciously chooses not to comply, or acts in a manner directly contrary to what the court has commanded, commits civil contempt. This includes situations where a party ignores an interlocutory order, violates an injunction, or fails to comply with directions given during proceedings. The key element is the wilful character: an accidental or inadvertent breach, or one done under genuine misunderstanding of the order, typically does not attract liability. Civil contempt is fundamentally about enforcement—it ensures that court orders remain effective and that the judicial system's commands carry practical weight. When a court decrees that X shall not happen, or that Y must be done, that decree must be capable of being enforced; otherwise the court becomes merely advisory. Criminal contempt, by contrast, operates preventively and protectively. It covers three distinct categories of wrongdoing: first, any act that scandalises the court—language or conduct that lowers public confidence in the judiciary or suggests it is corrupt, partisan or incompetent; second, any act that prejudices a judicial proceeding—such as witness intimidation, evidence destruction, or statements that create a real risk of prejudicing a fair trial; and third, interference with the administration of justice—obstructing court processes, disobeying court officials, or acting in court in ways that disrupt proceedings. Criminal contempt need not involve any direct court order; it captures conduct that damages the institution of justice itself. A newspaper article falsely accusing judges of corruption, a witness being threatened before trial, or a crowd physically preventing access to court premises—each represents criminal contempt regardless of whether any specific order was disobeyed. The harm is institutional rather than order-specific. These two categories interact critically. Civil contempt is narrow: it requires proof of a specific order and wilful breach. Criminal contempt is broader: it protects judicial functioning without reference to any particular order. A single act might constitute both—for instance, publicly burning a court order while defying its terms. However, the defences diverge significantly. The most important statutory defence applies to criminal contempt: truth published in public interest. This is a crucial safeguard against weaponisation of contempt law. A person who publishes factual information that is genuinely in the public interest—such as exposing judicial corruption, inefficiency, or systemic problems—gains protection even if the publication scandalises or criticises the court, provided the allegations are true and the motive is public benefit rather than personal vendetta or malice. This defence recognises that blind shielding of courts from legitimate public scrutiny would itself undermine democracy. No comparable defence exists for civil contempt, because civil contempt's focus is order-compliance, not truth-evaluation. There is no public interest exception to obeying a lawful court order. Contempt law occupies a unique constitutional space. It is neither purely criminal nor purely civil; it blends characteristics of both and serves the Constitution's guarantee of an independent judiciary. It connects to fundamental rights—free speech must coexist with court authority—and to the rule of law itself. Contempt differs from ordinary crime because the complainant is often the court itself, creating an apparent conflict of interest, which is why procedural safeguards (opportunity to show cause, proportionality in punishment) are essential. It neighbours related concepts like obstruction of justice under criminal law, but contempt is broader and focuses on institutional harm rather than specific criminal obstruction. It also interfaces with defamation, but contempt is not about personal reputation; it is about institutional integrity. A judge may personally suffer defamation, yet no contempt occurs if the institution of courts is not damaged. Conversely, a statement may not defame any individual judge but still scandalise the court as an institution. CLAT examiners frequently exploit the ambiguity between civil and criminal contempt. They present fact patterns where a court order is violated but frame the question around whether public confidence is damaged, trying to make candidates confuse the categories. They also test whether candidates understand that mere disrespect, anger, or harsh criticism of judges—without more—does not automatically constitute contempt. A lawyer criticising a judgment sharply, or a news channel questioning judicial competence, requires more than thin displeasure to cross into contempt territory. Additionally, examiners test the truth-defence by presenting scenarios where a statement is true but not in public interest, or in public interest but not proven true, to see if candidates mechanically apply the defence. They may also reverse roles—presenting a judge who acts in contempt of higher court orders, testing whether candidates recognise that the doctrine applies bidirectionally. Finally, examiners sometimes blur contempt with simple disobedience of administrative orders or non-judicial authorities, trying to see if candidates wrongly expand contempt's scope beyond courts.