Divorce under the Hindu Marriage Act represents one of the most consequential remedies in Indian family law, dissolving the marital bond and enabling either spouse to remarry. The Act recognises two principal pathways to divorce: contested divorce on specified grounds, and consensual divorce by mutual agreement. The statutory grounds for contested divorce include adultery (voluntary sexual intercourse with a person other than the spouse), cruelty (conduct that causes mental or physical suffering making cohabitation unsafe), desertion (abandonment for a continuous period of two years without reasonable cause), conversion to another religion, incurable unsoundness of mind, virulent leprosy or venereal disease in a communicable form, renunciation of Hindu religion by embracing monastic life, and presumption of death (when the spouse has been absent for seven years with no authentic news of being alive). Mutual consent divorce, by contrast, does not require proof of any ground; instead, it mandates that both spouses jointly petition the court after a mandatory separation period of one year, signalling genuine consensus rather than coercion. These grounds and procedures interact systematically to balance the stability of marriage against the legitimate interest of a spouse in exit when the marriage has irretrievably broken down. The law recognises that while marriage is a fundamental social institution deserving protection, it is not so sacrosanct that it must be preserved when it becomes a source of genuine harm or has fundamentally lost its consensual character. The distinction between contested and consensual grounds reflects differing philosophical underpinnings: contested grounds rest on the principle that one spouse has committed a matrimonial wrong justifying dissolution, whereas mutual consent assumes no wrongdoing but accepts that the subjective reality of irretrievable breakdown is sufficient. The mandatory waiting period before mutual consent divorce—one full year from the date of the first joint petition—operates as a statutory cooling-off mechanism, preventing hasty decisions made in temporary discord and allowing time for reconciliation or genuine reflection. This temporal requirement applies independently of the presence or absence of children, though the welfare of children becomes paramount in ancillary matters like custody and maintenance. The consequences of divorce extend far beyond the mere severance of the marital tie. A decree absolute dissolves all rights and obligations arising from the marriage, permitting both parties to remarry. However, ancillary reliefs—maintenance, alimony, property division, and custody—persist as separate legal claims grounded in matrimonial statutes and principles of equity. The spouse seeking divorce on contested grounds may simultaneously claim maintenance and support, whereas the defaulting spouse cannot recover property or maintenance despite being a party to the marriage. Defences to contested divorce are limited but significant: the respondent may deny the factual allegations constituting the ground, establish that the petitioner was complicit in the conduct (condonation), show that the petitioner delayed proceedings unreasonably (acquiescence), or prove that the ground itself does not satisfy the statutory definition. For instance, a single instance of infidelity, though morally reprehensible, may not constitute adultery if it was isolated and does not demonstrate a pattern or intent to establish an illicit relationship. Similarly, cruelty requires proof of conduct that is objectively grave and not merely disagreeable behaviour or incompatibility. The law thus protects against trivialisation of divorce while remaining responsive to genuine cases of matrimonial breakdown. Divorce law under the Hindu Marriage Act exists within a dense ecosystem of related doctrines. Judicial separation, a related remedy, suspends the rights and obligations of marriage without dissolving it—useful when a spouse is not ready to terminate the marriage definitively or when religious or moral convictions preclude remarriage. Restitution of conjugal rights, though rarely granted in modern practice, attempts to restore the marital relationship by compelling a spouse guilty of desertion to return. Maintenance claims, governed by separate statutory provisions, protect economically dependent spouses and children regardless of divorce grounds. These doctrines reflect the law's nuanced engagement with marriage: it recognises both the importance of marital commitment and the autonomy of individuals to exit harmful or unsustainable relationships. The rise of mutual consent divorce reflects a gradual shift toward recognising subjective reality and autonomy over moral blame and fault-finding, though contested grounds remain available where consensus is absent. CLAT examiners frequently test divorce law by introducing subtle distortions and scope-creep tactics. A common trap involves stating that a spouse abandoned the marriage for 18 months and asking whether divorce is available—the candidate must recognise that the statutory period is two continuous years, not merely a substantial period. Another twist presents a case of mutual infidelity and asks whether adultery is established; examiners expect recognition that both spouses committing adultery may not bar relief, depending on the statutory text and whether the law treats mutual fault as condonation. A frequent confusion arises between desertion and mere separation: desertion requires not only factual abandonment but also an intention to permanently abandon and absence of consent, whereas consensual separation does not constitute desertion. Examiners may also present facts where one party unilaterally declares an intention to divorce and then claims the one-year period has elapsed; candidates must identify that mutual consent requires both parties to jointly file, not unilateral declarations. Finally, a scope-creep trap imports rules from succession law or property law, asking about the effect of divorce on inheritance rights or joint property, inviting candidates to mistakenly apply doctrines outside the family law framework rather than grounding analysis in the specific matrimonial statutes and the principle of disentanglement that underlies divorce law.