Malicious prosecution is a tort remedy available when someone has wrongfully set the criminal justice system in motion against another person. Unlike defamation or false imprisonment, which operate in the civil domain, malicious prosecution is unique because it scrutinizes the *abuse* of the criminal process itself. The Indian law on this subject is not codified in a single statute like contract law, but emerges from the common law tradition adopted at independence and refined through judicial interpretation. The foundational principle recognizes that while every citizen has a right to report crimes and initiate proceedings, that right is not absolute—it becomes actionable when exercised dishonestly and without genuine belief in the accused's guilt. The tort requires proof of four essential elements working in concert. First, the defendant must have *instituted* criminal proceedings, meaning they took active steps to set the process in motion, either by lodging a First Information Report, obtaining a criminal summons, or testifying in a manner that materially influenced the prosecution. Second, there must be an *absence of reasonable and probable cause*—this is not the same as absence of legal guilt; rather, it means the defendant did not possess facts which, to a reasonable person in their position, would appear to constitute a ground for proceeding. This is evaluated objectively, considering what facts were actually before the defendant at that moment. Third, the proceedings must have been *actuated by malice*, which in tort law means either spite, ill-will, and improper motive, or reckless disregard for the rights of the accused. The malice need not be conscious hatred; it suffices if the defendant acted with knowledge of falsehood or with such indifference to truth as to amount to recklessness. Fourth, the *termination in favour of the claimant* is crucial—acquittal, discharge by a magistrate, withdrawal of the case, or any outcome clearing the accused supports the claim. These elements are not independent; they interact dynamically. The absence of reasonable cause becomes stronger evidence of malice, and vice versa. A defendant might have initiated proceedings on facts that seemed reasonable at the outset, but if subsequent investigation revealed the falsity and the defendant nonetheless pushed the case forward with knowledge of that falsity, malice is established. The consequences of successfully proving malicious prosecution are both remedial and deterrent. The claimant recovers damages for loss of reputation, injury to feelings, costs incurred in defending the criminal prosecution, and sometimes consequential losses like lost employment or business. Courts in India have recognized that the mental agony and social stigma of facing criminal charges constitute real injury deserving compensation. However, defences exist and operate strictly. The defendant can escape liability by proving that they had reasonable and probable cause and acted without malice—either element suffices as a complete defence. A defendant who genuinely believed facts constituting an offence, and acted in good faith based on reasonable investigation, will not be liable even if the facts later prove untrue. Public officials and those obligated by law to report crimes receive qualified immunity in some contexts, though this protection is narrower than absolute privilege in defamation. Importantly, a conviction of the accused in the criminal proceedings, standing alone, does not bar the tort claim, because the issue is whether the *initiation* was malicious and without cause, not whether the eventual conviction was justified. The tort exists precisely to check those who misuse the state's prosecutorial machinery before trial, irrelevant of what trial ultimately shows. Malicious prosecution occupies a distinct space within Indian tort law, situated between defamation (which protects reputation through false statements) and false imprisonment (which protects liberty from wrongful confinement). While all three can arise from the same facts, they protect different interests and have different requirements. Defamation requires a false statement communicated to third parties; malicious prosecution requires active instigation of state proceedings without cause. False imprisonment is about unlawful confinement itself, whereas malicious prosecution is about the wrongful *initiation* of lawful process. The tort also intersects with criminal law—a person prosecuted can, if acquitted, potentially bring a malicious prosecution suit against the informant or complainant. This creates an important feedback loop: the criminal justice system must be open to all (police cannot refuse to register cases based on their assessment of merit), yet those who abuse this openness face civil consequence. Additionally, the tort relates to concepts of public policy: courts balance the need to encourage citizens to report genuine crimes (public interest) against the need to deter harassment through false accusations (individual justice). CLAT examiners frequently distort the doctrine in ways that test whether students understand its true elements. A common trap is presenting a scenario where criminal proceedings were initiated on facts that *seemed* reasonable to the defendant at the time, but were later disproven, and asking whether malicious prosecution lies. Students often assume guilt proves absence of cause; in reality, the defendant's honest belief and reasonable basis at the *moment of initiation* is what matters. Another favourite twist is the question of who can sue—examiners sometimes include a scenario where a third party (not the accused) tries to claim malicious prosecution; the answer is that only the person against whom proceedings were brought has standing. Yet another distortion occurs when examiners import the criminal standard of proof (beyond reasonable doubt) into the tort standard (balance of probabilities), subtly suggesting a higher threshold exists than actually does. Some questions conflate malice in tort (absence of honest belief and reasonable cause) with malice in criminal law (conscious wrongdoing), leading to confusion about intent. Finally, examiners may present a case where the defendant's actions aided the prosecution but did not *institute* proceedings—for instance, a witness who testifies falsely—and test whether students incorrectly extend the tort to cover mere participation in the criminal process rather than its *initiation*. Distinguishing between these scenarios is crucial for CLAT success.