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Coastal Security Scheme — Explained

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Detailed Explanation

The Coastal Security Scheme (CSS) represents a foundational pillar of India's multi-layered maritime security architecture, a strategic response to the inherent vulnerabilities of its extensive coastline. Its evolution reflects a gradual but determined shift towards a more proactive and integrated approach to safeguarding national interests from sea-borne threats.

<h3>Origin and History: The Genesis of Coastal Vigilance</h3> India's coastline, stretching over 7,500 km, has historically been susceptible to various illicit activities, including smuggling, illegal immigration, and, more critically, infiltration by terrorists.

The Kargil Review Committee Report (1999) and the subsequent Group of Ministers (GoM) recommendations (2001) highlighted significant gaps in coastal security, particularly concerning non-major ports and the lack of a dedicated civilian law enforcement agency for coastal areas.

These recommendations laid the groundwork for a structured response. The Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) thus conceptualized the Coastal Security Scheme, launching its first phase in 2005. While initially focused on strengthening the Marine Police, the scheme gained unprecedented urgency and scale following the devastating 26/11 Mumbai terror attacks in 2008, which starkly exposed the porous nature of India's maritime borders and the critical need for robust coastal defence.

<h3>Constitutional and Legal Basis: A Framework of Shared Responsibility</h3> The CSS operates within India's federal structure, drawing its legal and administrative legitimacy from the constitutional division of powers.

While 'Defence of India' (Entry 2, List I - Union List) and 'Naval, military and air forces' (Entry 2A, List I) fall under the Union's exclusive domain, 'Public Order' (Entry 1, List II - State List) and 'Police' (Entry 2, List II) are primarily state subjects.

Coastal security, therefore, necessitates a collaborative approach. The MHA, as the nodal ministry for internal security, frames the policy and provides financial assistance, while the maritime states and Union Territories (UTs) are responsible for implementation through their respective Marine Police Forces.

This cooperative federalism is crucial for effective ground-level enforcement, as local police possess jurisdictional authority and local intelligence networks. The scheme is further buttressed by various acts, including the Coast Guard Act, 1978, and the Territorial Waters, Continental Shelf, Exclusive Economic Zone and Other Maritime Zones Act, 1976, which define the operational areas and powers of various agencies.

<h3>Key Provisions and Components: Building the First Line of Defence</h3> The CSS is structured around several core components designed to create a comprehensive first line of defence:

Marine Police Force Strengthening: This is the cornerstone of CSS. It involves:

* Organization: Creation of dedicated Marine Police units, often headed by Superintendents of Police (SPs) or Deputy SPs, with clear chains of command within the state police structure. * Training: Specialized training modules for Marine Police personnel, covering seamanship, navigation, maritime law, search and rescue, anti-smuggling operations, and counter-terrorism tactics.

The Indian Coast Guard (ICG) and Indian Navy play a significant role in imparting this training. For instance, the National Academy of Coastal Policing (NACP) in Dwarka, Gujarat, established in 2018, is a dedicated institution for this purpose (Source: PIB, 2018).

* Funding: The scheme provides for 100% central funding for non-recurring expenditure (e.g., boats, police stations) and 50% for recurring expenditure (e.g., fuel, maintenance) to states, with UTs receiving 100% central funding for both.

This ensures financial viability for states to maintain the force. * Equipment: Provision of modern equipment, including fast interceptor boats, vehicles for coastal patrolling, all-terrain vehicles (ATVs), communication systems (VHF sets, satellite phones), and weaponry.

* Manpower Targets: The scheme aimed to create a dedicated force of several thousand personnel across coastal states/UTs, with specific targets for each phase.

Coastal Police Stations (CPS):

* Number and Siting: Phase-I envisaged 73 CPS, later expanded to 204 in Phase-II, and further enhanced. These stations are strategically located along the coastline, particularly near vulnerable areas, non-major ports, and fishing hubs.

Siting guidelines prioritize operational reach and response time. * Infrastructure: Each CPS is equipped with necessary infrastructure, including barracks, administrative blocks, jetties for boat berthing, and communication rooms.

* Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs): Uniform SOPs are developed for coastal patrolling, intelligence gathering, response to incidents, and coordination with other agencies.

Interceptor Boats:

* Classes and Procurement: The scheme facilitates the procurement of various classes of interceptor boats, primarily Fast Interceptor Crafts (FIC) and Interceptor Boats (IB). Phase-I provided 204 boats, and Phase-II added 200 more.

These boats are typically 12-18 meters long, capable of speeds exceeding 25-30 knots, with a range suitable for coastal patrolling. Procurement is often through public sector shipyards like Goa Shipyard Limited (GSL) and Mazagon Dock Shipbuilders Limited (MDL).

* Operational Use: Used for patrolling territorial waters, intercepting suspicious vessels, anti-smuggling operations, and search and rescue missions.

Coastal Radar Systems and Surveillance Network: Post-26/11, the emphasis shifted significantly towards technological surveillance. This includes:

* Static Sensors: Establishment of a chain of static coastal surveillance radars along the coastline, integrated with electro-optic sensors (day/night cameras) for visual identification. * Network Topology: These sensors form part of the National Coastal Security Grid, feeding data into Joint Operations Centres (JOCs) managed by the ICG and ultimately contributing to the larger National Maritime Domain Awareness (NMDA) framework.

* Vendors: Public sector undertakings like Bharat Electronics Limited (BEL) and private players are involved in providing these systems. * Automatic Identification System (AIS): Mandatory fitment of AIS transponders on fishing vessels above a certain length to track their movements, preventing their misuse by hostile elements.

Coordination Mechanisms: Effective coastal security hinges on seamless inter-agency coordination:

* MHA: Nodal ministry, policy formulation, funding, overall oversight. * State Home Departments/Police: Implementation, operational command of Marine Police. * Indian Coast Guard (ICG): Designated as the overall coordinator for coastal security in territorial waters, responsible for operational command and control, training of Marine Police, and joint patrolling.

ICG operates 42 stations along the coast (Source: ICG website, 2024). * Indian Navy: Responsible for overall maritime security, including deep-sea surveillance and protection of national assets.

The Navy's Sagar Prahari Bal (SPB) units also contribute to coastal defence. * Other Agencies: Customs (anti-smuggling), Intelligence Bureau (IB) (intelligence gathering), National Investigation Agency (NIA) (maritime terrorism cases), Border Security Force (BSF) (creek areas, particularly in Gujarat), and local fishing communities (as 'eyes and ears').

<h3>Practical Functioning: A Layered Approach</h3> The CSS facilitates a layered security approach. The Marine Police, operating from CPS with interceptor boats, forms the innermost layer, responsible for shallow waters, creeks, and immediate coastline.

The ICG forms the intermediate layer, patrolling territorial waters and the EEZ. The Indian Navy constitutes the outermost layer, ensuring security in the high seas. Regular joint exercises (e.g., 'Sagar Kavach') are conducted to enhance interoperability and coordination among these agencies.

Intelligence sharing is formalized through various platforms, including the Multi-Agency Centre (MAC) and Subsidiary Multi-Agency Centres (SMACs).

<h3>Scheme Evolution: Phases of Enhancement</h3>

Phase-I (2005-2009):

* Objectives: Initial strengthening of Marine Police, establishment of basic infrastructure. * Budget: Approximately Rs. 400 crore (Source: MHA Annual Report, 2005-06). * Outputs: 73 Coastal Police Stations, 204 interceptor boats, 104 jeeps, 245 motorcycles, and associated equipment. * Focus: Capacity building of state police for coastal patrolling.

Phase-II (2009-2014):

* Objectives: Significant expansion and modernization post-26/11, with a greater emphasis on surveillance and advanced equipment. * Budget: Approximately Rs. 1580 crore (Source: MHA Annual Report, 2009-10).

* Outputs: 131 additional Coastal Police Stations, 200 more interceptor boats (more advanced), 10 marine commandos for each CPS, and a focus on coastal radar chain. * Changes: Increased central funding, enhanced training, integration with ICG's operational command.

Phase-III / Current Initiatives (Post-2014 up to 2024):

* Objectives: Focus on sustainability, maintenance, technology upgrades, and comprehensive Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA). * Budget: Continued allocations under MHA's internal security budget, with emphasis on operational readiness and technology (e.

g., Rs. 1600 crore for Phase-III over 5 years, as reported by media based on MHA statements, 2016). * Key Upgrades: Full operationalization of the National Coastal Security Grid, integration of Vessel Traffic Management Systems (VTMS), deployment of CCTVs at vulnerable points, use of drones for surveillance, enhanced community interaction programs (e.

g., 'Sagar Prahari' initiative involving fishermen), and focus on maintenance infrastructure for boats. * Policy Shifts: Greater emphasis on real-time data sharing, cyber security aspects of maritime systems, and international cooperation for maritime security.

<h3>Criticism and Challenges: Hurdles to Comprehensive Security</h3> Despite its critical importance, CSS has faced several implementation challenges:

Implementation Delays: Procurement of boats, construction of CPS, and installation of radar systems have often faced delays due to bureaucratic hurdles, land acquisition issues, and technical complexities (Source: CAG Report, 2015-16, on Coastal Security).

Manpower Shortages: States have struggled with recruitment, retention, and adequate training of Marine Police personnel, leading to understaffing and operational gaps (Source: Parliamentary Standing Committee Report on Home Affairs, 2018).

Maintenance Issues: A significant number of interceptor boats have been reported non-operational due to lack of spare parts, inadequate maintenance facilities, and skilled technicians (Source: Media reports from various states, e.g., Kerala, Karnataka, 2019-2021).

Inter-agency Coordination Gaps: Despite formal mechanisms, practical challenges in real-time intelligence sharing, command and control, and resource allocation persist among various agencies (Marine Police, ICG, Navy, Customs, etc.).

Funding Utilization: Some states have shown suboptimal utilization of allocated funds, leading to delays in infrastructure development and equipment procurement (Source: CAG Report, 2015-16).

Technological Obsolescence: The rapid pace of technological change means that initially procured equipment can become outdated quickly, requiring continuous upgrades and training.

<h3>Recent Developments (up to 2024): Towards a Smarter Grid</h3> Recent years have seen a renewed push for an integrated and technologically advanced coastal security framework. The focus is on leveraging Artificial Intelligence (AI) and Machine Learning (ML) for anomaly detection in maritime traffic, expanding the reach of surveillance through drones and unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs), and strengthening cyber resilience of coastal infrastructure.

The establishment of the National Academy of Coastal Policing (NACP) in Dwarka, Gujarat, is a significant step towards standardized and advanced training for Marine Police. There's also an increased emphasis on community engagement, recognizing fishing communities as vital stakeholders in coastal vigilance.

<h3>Vyyuha Analysis: Beyond the Surface</h3> From a UPSC perspective, the critical examination angle here is how CSS represents a profound shift from a reactive, incident-driven approach to a proactive, layered, and intelligence-led coastal defence strategy.

The scheme is not merely about boats and police stations; it's about building a 'security mindset' across diverse stakeholders. However, Vyyuha's analysis reveals hidden integration challenges that go beyond mere operational coordination.

These include 'turf wars' between agencies, data silos despite common platforms, and varying levels of political will and administrative capacity across states. Policy trade-offs are also evident: balancing stringent security measures with the livelihoods of fishing communities, ensuring central oversight without infringing on state autonomy, and investing in high-tech solutions versus basic infrastructure for remote areas.

The scheme's success is a testament to India's commitment to internal security, but its persistent challenges underscore the complexities of governance in a federal, diverse nation. The true measure of CSS lies not just in assets procured, but in the seamless 'interoperability quotient' of its human and technological components.

<h3>Inter-topic Connections: A Web of Governance</h3>

Maritime Security Challenges : CSS directly addresses threats like maritime terrorism, piracy, and smuggling, which are core maritime security concerns.

Internal Security Coordination Mechanisms : The scheme exemplifies Centre-State and inter-agency coordination, a critical aspect of India's internal security architecture.

Technology in Governance : Integration of radar, AIS, and surveillance systems showcases the role of technology in enhancing security and governance.

Border Security Infrastructure : CSS complements land border security efforts by securing the maritime flank, preventing ingress/egress through sea routes.

Federalism: The Centre-State funding model and shared responsibilities highlight the practical application of cooperative federalism in security matters.

Disaster Management: Marine Police, strengthened by CSS, often play a crucial role in coastal disaster response, search, and rescue operations during cyclones and other natural calamities.

<h3>Case Studies: State-Level Implementation and Lessons</h3>

Gujarat: A Model of Robustness (Source: Gujarat Police, ICG reports)

* Chronology: Gujarat, with its longest coastline and proximity to Pakistan, has been a focus area. Post-26/11, it significantly ramped up its Marine Police and surveillance. The state has actively participated in all phases of CSS.

* Interventions: Established numerous CPS, procured a large fleet of interceptor boats, and integrated its coastal surveillance with the ICG's network. The state also has a dedicated 'Sagar Rakshak Dal' (Coastal Security Force) involving local fishermen.

* Successes: Frequent interceptions of drug consignments (e.g., October 2023: Gujarat ATS and Coast Guard intercepted a Pakistani boat carrying 80 kg of heroin worth Rs 560 crore off the Gujarat coast, leading to the arrest of 14 Pakistani nationals.

Source: The Hindu, Oct 28, 2023), illegal fishing vessels, and prevention of infiltration attempts. Active participation in joint exercises like 'Sagar Kavach'. * Failures/Challenges: Despite successes, challenges remain in fully manning all posts and ensuring continuous maintenance of all assets due to the sheer scale of the coastline.

* Key Lessons: Strong political will, active community participation, and seamless integration with central agencies are critical for effective coastal security.

Tamil Nadu: Balancing Security and Livelihoods (Source: Tamil Nadu Police, PIB)

* Chronology: Tamil Nadu faces unique challenges due to its proximity to Sri Lanka, leading to issues of illegal migration, smuggling, and fishing disputes. It has been a key beneficiary of CSS since Phase-I.

* Interventions: Established a dedicated Coastal Security Group (CSG) within the state police, operating numerous CPS and interceptor boats. Focus on intelligence gathering from fishing communities.

* Successes: Effective management of fishing disputes, interception of contraband (e.g., July 2022: Tamil Nadu Coastal Security Group seized 1,500 kg of sea cucumbers, a protected species, worth Rs 1.

5 crore, intended for smuggling to Sri Lanka. Source: The Times of India, July 18, 2022), and rescue operations during natural disasters (e.g., December 2017: Tamil Nadu CSG played a crucial role in search and rescue operations during Cyclone Ockhi, saving numerous fishermen.

Source: NDTV, Dec 4, 2017). * Failures/Challenges: Persistent issues with illegal fishing by Sri Lankan nationals and cross-border smuggling, requiring continuous vigilance and diplomatic efforts.

* Key Lessons: The importance of community engagement and intelligence-led operations in sensitive maritime zones.

West Bengal: Addressing Riverine and Estuarine Challenges (Source: West Bengal Police, MHA reports)

* Chronology: West Bengal's coastline, characterized by the Sunderbans delta and numerous estuaries, presents complex security challenges. The state has been part of CSS since its inception. * Interventions: Established CPS in the Sunderbans and other vulnerable areas, procured specialized shallow-draft boats suitable for riverine patrolling.

Focus on training personnel for complex deltaic environments. * Successes: Interception of illegal migrants and smugglers in the Sunderbans region (e.g., March 2021: West Bengal Marine Police apprehended several individuals attempting to illegally cross into Bangladesh via the Sunderbans.

Source: local media reports, March 2021). Participation in joint security drills. * Failures/Challenges: The unique geography of the Sunderbans (dense mangroves, numerous creeks) makes surveillance and patrolling extremely difficult, leading to persistent challenges in preventing cross-border crimes.

Procurement of suitable boats for shallow waters has also been a challenge. * Key Lessons: Tailoring security solutions to specific geographical challenges and enhancing technological surveillance in complex terrains.

<h3>Concrete Examples of Scheme Successes and Failures:</h3>

Success (Gujarat, 2023): — Gujarat ATS and Coast Guard intercepted a Pakistani boat carrying 80 kg of heroin worth Rs 560 crore off the Gujarat coast, leading to the arrest of 14 Pakistani nationals. This demonstrated effective intelligence sharing and inter-agency coordination. (Source: The Hindu, Oct 28, 2023)

Success (Tamil Nadu, 2022): — Tamil Nadu Coastal Security Group seized 1,500 kg of sea cucumbers, a protected species, worth Rs 1.5 crore, intended for smuggling to Sri Lanka. This highlights the Marine Police's role in combating environmental crimes. (Source: The Times of India, July 18, 2022)

Failure (CAG Report, 2015-16): — A Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG) report highlighted significant underutilization of funds and non-operational boats in several states under CSS Phase-II. For instance, in Karnataka, 10 out of 12 interceptor boats were non-operational due to lack of crew and maintenance. (Source: CAG Report No. 22 of 2016, Union Government, Ministry of Home Affairs)

Failure (Parliamentary Answer, 2018): — MHA acknowledged delays in the establishment and full operationalization of the coastal radar chain in some sensitive areas, citing issues with land acquisition and technical integration. This impacted the real-time surveillance capabilities. (Source: Lok Sabha Unstarred Question No. 1658, Answered on 24.07.2018)

Success (Andaman & Nicobar, 2022): — Joint operations by Andaman & Nicobar Police (Marine Police) and Indian Coast Guard led to the apprehension of several illegal immigrants from Myanmar and Bangladesh, preventing their entry into the mainland. This showcased effective coordination in island territories. (Source: The Economic Times, Feb 20, 2022)

Success (Joint Exercises): — Regular 'Sagar Kavach' exercises, conducted biannually, demonstrate improved interoperability. For instance, the October 2023 exercise along the entire western coast involved all maritime security agencies, successfully simulating infiltration attempts and response mechanisms. (Source: PIB, Oct 11, 2023)

Failure (Kerala, 2019): — Media reports indicated that a significant number of interceptor boats provided to the Kerala Marine Police were lying idle due to lack of maintenance, spare parts, and trained personnel. This hampered effective patrolling. (Source: The New Indian Express, Nov 25, 2019)

Success (All Coastal States, Post-2015): — The mandatory fitment of AIS transponders on fishing boats above 20 meters, initiated under CSS upgrades, has significantly improved the tracking of fishing vessels, reducing the risk of their misuse for illicit activities. (Source: MHA guidelines, 2015 onwards)

Failure (West Bengal, 2020): — Challenges in procuring specialized shallow-draft boats suitable for the Sunderbans' complex riverine terrain led to delays in fully equipping Marine Police stations in the region, impacting their reach. (Source: Local media reports, 2020)

Success (Maharashtra, 2021): — Enhanced intelligence sharing between the Maharashtra Marine Police, Coast Guard, and Customs led to the prevention of several gold and arms smuggling attempts, demonstrating improved coordination post-26/11 reforms. (Source: Directorate of Revenue Intelligence reports, 2021)

<h3>Bibliography:</h3>

Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India. Annual Reports (various years, 2005-2023). [https://www.mha.gov.in/documents/annual-reports](https://www.mha.gov.in/documents/annual-reports) (Accessed: May 2024)

Press Information Bureau (PIB), Government of India. Press Releases on Coastal Security Scheme (various dates). [https://pib.gov.in/](https://pib.gov.in/) (Accessed: May 2024)

Comptroller and Auditor General of India. Report No. 22 of 2016, Union Government, Ministry of Home Affairs (Performance Audit of Coastal Security). [https://cag.gov.in/](https://cag.gov.in/) (Accessed: May 2024)

Indian Coast Guard. Official Website. [https://indiancoastguard.gov.in/](https://indiancoastguard.gov.in/) (Accessed: May 2024)

Lok Sabha Unstarred Question No. 1658, Answered on 24.07.2018. (Accessed via Parliament website, May 2024)

The Hindu. 'Gujarat ATS, Coast Guard intercept Pakistani boat with 80 kg heroin'. October 28, 2023. (Accessed: May 2024)

The Times of India. 'Coastal Security Group seizes 1,500 kg sea cucumbers'. July 18, 2022. (Accessed: May 2024)

NDTV. 'Cyclone Ockhi: Tamil Nadu Coastal Security Group rescues fishermen'. December 4, 2017. (Accessed: May 2024)

The Economic Times. 'Andaman & Nicobar Police, Coast Guard apprehend illegal immigrants'. Feb 20, 2022. (Accessed: May 2024)

The New Indian Express. 'Kerala's Marine Police boats lie idle'. Nov 25, 2019. (Accessed: May 2024)